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Abstract 
We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and 
within-team incentives affects behavior in team tournaments. Theory predicts that 
free-riding is likely to occur when there are only between-team incentives, and 
offering within-team incentives may solve this problem. However, if individuals 
collude, then within-team incentives may not be as effective at reducing free-riding. 
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the results of our experiment indicate 
that although between-team incentives are effective at increasing individual effort, 
there is substantial free-riding and declining effort over time. Importantly, a 
combination of between-team and within-team incentives is effective not only at 
generating effort but also at sustaining effort over time, mitigating free-riding 
problem, increasing cooperation and decreasing collusion within teams. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of teams in organizations has become increasingly popular in the U.S. workplace 
and elsewhere (Che and Yoo, 2001; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). Teams can increase the 
efficient application of specialized knowledge and skills to achieve greater collective performance 
(Cohen, 1993; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). Accordingly, how to design incentives in team 
settings is an interesting and important topic. Organizations consisting of teams can incentivize 
employees’ effort based on (1) individual performance, (2) team performance, or (3) a combination 
of both. While the effects of individual and team incentives, in isolation, have been studied in the 
literature (e.g., Prendergast, 1999; Konrad, 2009; Connelly et al., 2014), less is known about the 
combined effects. 
One way to design incentives to motivate agents in both individual and team settings is to 
introduce a tournament. The use of tournaments to evaluate and reward performance has increased 
in the corporate world (Boyle, 2001; McGregor, 2006; Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006) and in the 
workplace (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez, 2009; Sheremeta, 
2016). In this study, we are particularly interested in a combination of between-team and within-
team tournaments.1 While it is well recognized in the literature that individual tournaments are 
effective at eliciting high effort from contestants (Dechenaux et al., 2015), such tournaments are 
susceptible to collusion, especially when individuals are allowed to communicate (Harbring, 2006; 
Sutter and Strassmair, 2009; Cason et al., 2012, 2017). Similarly, within the literature team 
tournaments have been shown to effectively generate high effort (Abbink et al., 2010; Sheremeta, 
2018), but such tournaments are susceptible to free-riding (Erev et al., 1993; Gunnthorsdottir and 
                                                 
1 Of course, the tournament manager has other ways of designing a tournament by changing the number of prizes 
(Orrison et al., 2004; Lim et al., 2009; Müller and Schotter, 2010), the number of players (Orrison et al., 2004), and 
heterogeneity within the tournament (Weigelt et al., 1989; Cason et al., 2010). 
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Rapoport, 2006). Therefore, the resulting effort from individuals under combined within-team and 
between-team tournaments is not clear as the problems of collusion and free-riding still potentially 
exist. To study the effectiveness of the combination of between-team and within-team tournaments 
we provide a theoretical model and test its predictions in a controlled laboratory experiment. 
Our model is built on the seminal nested contest model of Nitzan (1991). Whereas the 
original model only contains an individual reward (within-team incentive), to examine our research 
question we introduce a team reward (between-team incentive). The inclusion of the team reward 
also makes the model more generalizable in practice, because businesses increasingly require 
cooperation among employees from across the organization and the use of group rewards is 
believed to foster this cooperation (Cohen, 1993; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). The 
theoretical Nash equilibrium predicts that free-riding behavior is likely to occur when there are 
only between-team incentives, and offering within-team incentives may solve this problem. 
However, if upon introduction of the within-team incentives individuals still choose to collude 
within a team, then the combined incentives may not be as effective at increasing effort and 
reducing free-riding. 
We tested the predictions of our model using a controlled laboratory experiment in which 
a team of three participants competes against another team of three participants by exerting effort. 
We used a 2×2 design, by manipulating between-team and within-team incentives. Prior to 
competition, participants had an opportunity to communicate with their team members increasing 
the likelihood of collusion. The results of our experiment indicate that although between-team 
incentives are effective at increasing individual effort, as predicted by the theory, there is 
substantial free-riding and declining effort over time. Within-team incentives are also effective at 
increasing individual effort, albeit not as effective as between-team incentives in our experiment 
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(due to potential collusive behavior). Most importantly, a combination of between-team and 
within-team incentives is effective not only at generating effort but also at sustaining effort over 
time, mitigating free-riding problem, increasing cooperation and decreasing collusion within 
teams. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. 
Section 3 describes experimental design, procedures and testable hypotheses. Section 4 provides 
analysis and Section 5 concludes by discussing implications and suggesting directions for future 
research.  
 
2. Theoretical Model 
Assume there are two teams competing to win a contest. For simplicity, assume that team 
𝐴𝐴 and team 𝐵𝐵 each consist of 𝑁𝑁 risk-neutral players. All players in both teams simultaneously and 
independently expend irreversible costly efforts 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗, where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁 and 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁. 
The team performance 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 (similarly 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗) is the sum of all individual efforts within team 𝐴𝐴 (Katz 
et al., 1990): 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 .         (1) 
After all players of team 𝐴𝐴 and team 𝐵𝐵 choose their efforts, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 and 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 are compared. The 
probability of team 𝐴𝐴 (similarly team 𝐵𝐵) winning is defined by a contest success function (CSF): 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = � 𝛼𝛼 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴+𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 12    if  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 > 0                   1
2
                      if  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 = 0  .     (2) 
This CSF is different from a standard CSF defined by Skaperdas (1996) and Münster 
(2009). One interpretation of the CSF (2) is that, with a probability 𝛼𝛼 winning depends on the 
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“merit” of one team relative to the other team (between-team incentive), and with the remaining 
probability (1 − 𝛼𝛼) winning depends on pure luck (Konrad, 2009). 
All members of the winning team receive a team reward 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 and an individual reward 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼. 
When the team reward is present, receiving individual reward 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 is contingent on receiving 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇. 
The team reward is equally shared by all team members, so that player 𝑖𝑖 in team 𝐴𝐴 receives 1
𝑁𝑁
𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇. 
The individual reward is allocated according to the sharing rule proposed by Nitzan (1991), so that 
player 𝑖𝑖 in team 𝐴𝐴 receives 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼, where 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛽𝛽 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽) 1𝑁𝑁   if  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 > 0             1
𝑁𝑁
                   if  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 0 .      (3) 
Similar to the interpretation of the CSF (2), the sharing rule (3) shows that, with a 
probability 𝛽𝛽 the individual reward 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 is allocated according to the “merit” of each individual 
within the team (within-team incentive), and with the remaining probability (1 − 𝛽𝛽) the individual 
reward is allocated randomly. 
Given (2) and (3), the expected payoff of a risk-neutral player 𝑖𝑖 in team 𝐴𝐴 can be written 
as: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 �1𝑁𝑁 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼� − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,       (4) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the between-team CSF defined by equation (2) and 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an individual’s share of the 
individual reward 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 defined by equation (3). 
Differentiating (4) with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (see the derivations in Appendix A), and solving for 
the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we receive: 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇+𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼)+𝛽𝛽(2𝑁𝑁−2)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼4𝑁𝑁2 .       (5) 
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A simple comparative static analysis shows that the equilibrium effort (5) is increasing in 
𝛼𝛼 (between-team incentive) and in 𝛽𝛽 (within-team incentive). 
If, as it is in this study, communication is allowed within each team, prior literature suggests 
that all individuals within each team may act cooperatively as one player (e.g., Sutter and 
Strassmair, 2009; Cason et al., 2012). In such a case, instead of an individual payoff (4), a risk-
neutral player 𝑖𝑖 in team 𝐴𝐴 should maximize the joint team payoff: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 �1𝑁𝑁 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼� − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼) − 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖.   (6) 
Differentiating (6) with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (see the derivations in Appendix A), and solving for 
the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we receive: 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇+𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼)4𝑁𝑁 .         (7) 
Intuitively, since each team member is maximizing the joint team payoff, the equilibrium 
effort (7) is only increasing in 𝛼𝛼 (between-team incentive) and it does not depend on 𝛽𝛽 (within-
team incentive). 
 
3. Experimental Design, Procedures and Predictions 
3.1. Experimental Design 
In order to examine how between-team and within-team incentives affect individual 
behavior, we collected data from a computerized experiment (Fischbacher, 2007). We used a 2×2 
design, as shown in Table 1, by manipulating between-team and within-team incentives. In all four 
conditions, a team of three participants (i.e., 𝑁𝑁 = 3) competed against another team of three 
participants by contributing points to a team account. These points translated directly into the 
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probabilities of receiving a team reward of 180 (i.e., 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 = 180) and an individual reward of 180 
(i.e., 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 = 180).2 
In the baseline NONE condition, all participants automatically split the team reward and 
the individual reward. Therefore, there were no between-team or within-team incentives (i.e., 𝛼𝛼 =0 and 𝛽𝛽 = 0). In WITHIN condition, all participants automatically split the team reward but the 
individual reward was allocated according to a lottery rule. For example, if a team member 
contributed 30 percent of his/her team’s total output, his/her probability of winning the individual 
reward was 30 percent. Therefore, in this condition, there are only within-team incentives (i.e., 
𝛼𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1). In BETWEEN condition, the team and individual rewards were allocated 
according to a lottery rule between teams but all participants of the winning team automatically 
split the team and individual rewards. For example, if a team contributed 70 percent of the two 
team’s total output, that team’s probability of winning the team and individual rewards was 70 
percent. Therefore, in this condition, there are only between-team incentives (i.e., 𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 =0). Finally, in BOTH condition, both the team reward and the individual reward were allocated 
according to a lottery rule. Therefore, in this condition, there are both between-team and within-
team incentives (𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1). 
 
3.2. Experimental Procedures 
A total of 144 students at a large university participated in 12 experimental sessions. Each 
session lasted about 70 minutes and had 12 participants. Each experimental session consisted of 
two parts, corresponding to two incentive conditions from Table 1.3 The exact order of procedures 
                                                 
2 The use of probability function in assigning rewards was designed to be consistent with the typical random noise 
added to an output function in labor economics literature (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).  
3 This design was chosen to minimize the number of participants necessary for the experiment, and to allow us to have 
direct within-subject comparisons while controlling for any between-subject differences. 
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is shown in Figure 1. As participants arrived, each was assigned a computer with privacy dividers. 
Then participants read the instructions (see Appendix B), after which they answered several 
questions to verify their understanding of the instructions. These forced manipulation checks 
ensured that participants understood all relevant aspects of the task and their particular 
experimental incentive condition. 
In Part 1 of the experiment, corresponding to one of the four experimental incentive 
conditions, participants were randomly assigned to a team (a total of three members in each team) 
and two teams were randomly paired. Participants remained in the same team and competed 
against the same paired team for 10 periods. In each period, every participant received 60 
experimental points as an endowment and had an opportunity to communicate with their team 
members for 90 seconds (40 seconds in periods 3-10) prior to making their decisions. After 
communication, each participant privately decided how many points (representing effort) to 
contribute to a team account.4 After all participants made their decisions, they were notified 
whether they won the team reward, and if so, then whether they also won the individual reward. 
Each participant was privately notified of his or her current period payoff. 
In Part 2, all participants were assigned to a new incentive condition. Each participant was 
also randomly assigned to a new team where their new teammates were not any of their teammates 
in Part 1. The new team was randomly paired with another new team and participants remained in 
the same team and competed against the same paired team for 10 periods under the new incentive 
                                                 
4 According to standard agency theory (Baiman, 1982; Namazi, 1985), effort is any action that satisfies three 
conditions: (1) the agent controls the action, (2) an increase in the action results in a rightward shift of the distribution 
of (i.e. greater) output, and (3) the agent receives disutility from exerting effort. Physical exertion is not a requirement 
for an action to be regarded as effort. 
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condition. To control for an order effect, in each session participants were randomly assigned to 
one of 12 combinations of two conditions.5 
At the end of the experiment, participants completed a demographic questionnaire. Two 
periods (one from each part) were randomly selected for payments. Earnings were converted into 
US dollars at the rate of 20 points to $1, and participants received their payments in private and in 
cash, ranging from $5 to $23.75, with an average $13.98. 
 
3.3. Predictions 
The four experimental conditions test how between-team and within-team incentives affect 
individual behavior. If we assume that individuals are perfectly rational and maximize their own 
payoffs, then individuals should exert effort defined by equation (5). In such a case, effort in 
NONE condition (𝛼𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽𝛽 = 0) should be 0, in WITHIN (𝛼𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1) should be 
(𝑁𝑁−1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
2𝑁𝑁2
= 20, in BETWEEN (𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 0) should be 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇+𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁2
= 10, and in BOTH (𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 
𝛽𝛽 = 1) should be 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇+(2𝑁𝑁−1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁2
= 30. 
Alternatively, if communication enhances group identity and causes individuals within 
each team to act cooperatively as one player, then individuals should exert effort defined by 
equation (7). In such a case, effort in NONE condition should be 0, in WITHIN should be 0, in 
BETWEEN should be 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇+𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁
= 30, and in BOTH should be 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇+𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁
= 30.  
Finally, it could be the case that individuals have mixed motives, trying to maximize their 
individual payoff as well as their joint team payoff. In such a case, effort should be a convex 
                                                 
5 Picking any 2 out of 4 experimental incentive conditions yields a total of 12 ordered combinations (e.g., NONE-
WITHIN and WITHIN-NONE). Each combination has 2 experimental conditions or parts. With 144 participants in 
total, this design results in 12 statistically independent observations (2 teams of 3 individuals each as one observation) 
in each condition. 
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combination of equations (5) and (7). Assuming a simple weighted average, see Table 2, effort in 
NONE condition should be 0, in WITHIN should be 10, in BETWEEN should be 20, and in BOTH 
should be 30. 
Based on these predictions, we can state testable hypotheses. First, it is clear that both 
between-team and within-team incentives should increase individual effort. 
Hypothesis 1: Between-team and within-team incentives increase individual effort relative 
to no incentives. 
Second, combining between-team and within-team incentives should have the greatest 
effect at increasing individual effort. 
Hypothesis 2: Combining between-team and within-team incentives has the greatest effect 
at increasing individual effort. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 provides an overview of the average effort and payoff within each experimental 
condition. Also, a graphical summary of results is presented in Figure 2. We use the average effort 
over all 10 periods by 6 participants (2 teams) as one independent observation. The Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test shows that the average effort in all conditions is higher than the Nash equilibrium 
predictions: the average effort level is 47.15 in BOTH condition, 42.61 in BETWEEN, 25.07 in 
WITHIN, and 9.47 in NONE.6 This is not surprising, given that the main observation, emerging 
                                                 
6 We compare the average effort to the predictions stated in Table 2, and find that in only 1 out of 9 cases the average 
effort is not significantly different from the predicted value. Specifically, the average effort in NONE is significantly 
different from 0 (Wilcoxon signed-rank; p-value < 0.01). The average effort in WITHIN is significantly different from 
0 (p-value < 0.01), 10 (p-value < 0.01), but not 20 (p-value = 0.11). The average effort in BETWEEN is significantly 
different from 10 (p-value < 0.01), 20 (p-value < 0.01), and 30 (p-value = 0.11). Finally, the average effort in BOTH 
is significantly different from 30 (p-value < 0.01).  
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from most experimental studies on group contests is that “the actual effort of subjects is 
signiﬁcantly higher than the Nash equilibrium prediction” (Sheremeta, 2018, p. 2).7 
 
4.2. Differences between Conditions 
The main purpose of our experiment was to examine how between-team and within-team 
incentives affect individual behavior. Therefore, we first examine whether between-team 
incentives (BOTH and BETWEEN conditions) motivate individuals to exert greater effort than 
when no between-team incentives are present (WITHIN and NONE conditions). On average, 
individual effort under between-team incentives is 27.61 greater than without between-team 
incentives (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value < 0.01), as shown in Table 4. We also examine whether 
within-team incentives (BOTH and WITHIN conditions) have a positive impact on individual 
effort. Table 4 shows that, on average, individuals exert 10.07 greater effort under within-team 
incentives, compared to no within-team incentives (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value = 0.07).8 
Result 1: Consistent with Hypothesis 1, both between-team and within-team incentives 
increase individual effort. 
Next, we examine whether individuals exert the greatest effort when between-team and 
within-team incentives are combined (as in BOTH condition). Table 4 shows that the average 
effort in BOTH condition is 37.68 greater than in NONE condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value 
< 0.01), 22.07 greater than in WITHIN condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value < 0.01), and 4.53 
greater than in BETWEEN condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value = 0.46). 
                                                 
7 The most common explanations for significant over-expenditure in group contests are overly competitive behavior 
of individuals in contests (Sheremeta, 2013, 2017), overly cooperative behavior in social dilemmas and collective 
action games (Ledyard et al, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011), parochial altruism (Bernhard et al., 2006; Choi and Bowles, 
2007), and group identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Chowdhury et al., 2016). 
8 We obtain similar results, when examining the data only from the first part of the experiment (see Table 4C in 
Appendix C).  
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Since each individual participated in two conditions, we can also analyze the data using a 
within-subject comparison. This is a more powerful non-parametric test as it gives us direct results 
as to how a participant behaves in two different incentive conditions. As shown in Table 5, 
individuals in BOTH condition exert the greatest effort, compared to other conditions (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank; all p-values < 0.03). This brings us to our next result: 
Result 2: Consistent with Hypothesis 2, combining between-team and within-team 
incentives has the greatest effect at increasing individual effort. 
 
4.3. Effort over Time 
Figure 3 shows the average effort across 10 periods for each condition. There are two 
immediate observations. First, there are clear differences between conditions. Second, effort 
decreases over time, most notably in NONE and BETWEEN conditions. In order to examine how 
repetition influences behavior, we conduct a time series cross-sectional regression analysis. In 
Table 6, we report the estimated results of linear cross-sectional time-series models with random 
effects on the participant level.9 We use the individual effort in a given period as the dependent 
variable, and the period number and constant as independent variables. Estimation results show 
that effort in NONE and BETWEEN conditions decreases with repetition of the experiment, which 
is demonstrated by a significantly negative period coefficient (p-value < 0.01).  
Result 3: Effort decreases over time when there are no incentives or only between-team 
incentives, while it remains stable when there are within-team incentives or combination of 
between-team and within-team incentives. 
                                                 
9 Taking the average effort in a group of six participants (i.e., both teams) as the unit of observation yields similar 
qualitative results.  
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In addition, the regression analysis confirms our previous results. Specifically, the last 
column of Table 6 shows that, compared to no incentives (the omitted NONE condition), within-
team incentives (WITHIN condition) increase effort by 15.60 (Wald Chi-Square test; p-value < 
0.01), between-team incentives (BETWEEN condition) increase effort by 33.14 (Wald Chi-Square 
test; p-value < 0.01), and combined between-team and within-team incentives (BOTH condition) 
increase effort by 37.68 (Wald Chi-Square test; p-value < 0.01). Moreover, effort in BOTH 
condition is significantly higher than in WITHIN condition (Wald Chi-Square test; p-value < 0.01) 
and BETWEEN condition (Wald Chi-Square test; p-value = 0.05), suggesting that combining 
between-team and within-team incentives has the greatest effect at increasing individual effort.10 
 
4.4. Free-riding 
In this section, we examine how between-team and within-team incentives affect free-
riding. Similar to Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) and Sheremeta (2011), we define free-
riding in a team contest when an individual exerts an effort of 0. Table 7 presents the frequency of 
zero effort in each condition by period. It is important to emphasize that an effort of 0 can be 
interpreted as a free-riding only in BETWEEN and BOTH conditions. There are a total of 103 
instances where individuals free-ride in BETWEEN condition, and only 31 in BOTH condition. 
Directly comparing BOTH condition with BETWEEN condition, we find about 69.9 percent less 
free-riding in BOTH condition. This difference is significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value = 0.03), 
confirming that a combination of between-team and within-team incentives is effective at 
mitigating free-riding problem.  
                                                 
10 We obtain similar results, when examining the data only from the first part of the experiment (see Table 6C in 
Appendix C).  
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Result 4: There is substantial free-riding when there are only between-team incentives, but 
free-riding behavior is reduced when between-team incentives are combined with within-team 
incentives. 
 
4.5. Cooperation and Collusion 
In our experiment, participants could communicate with each other by sending messages 
via chat windows. To analyze these messages, we first read the messages and established a set of 
four categories for cooperation and four for collusion.11 The details of these categories are shown 
in Table 8. There are a total of 7,671 communication messages recorded, with an average of 80 
chat messages within a single team in each experimental session. On average, in each experimental 
session there are 289 messages in NONE condition, 288 messages in WITHIN, 350 messages in 
BETWEEN, and 353 messages in BOTH. Next, two graduate students, trained separately, 
independently read and coded the communication messages for each team in each period, 
assigning the value of 1 if a message belongs to a given category and 0 otherwise.12 The coders 
were not informed about any of the hypotheses in the study. All messages within each team in each 
period are taken as one observation for coding, resulting in 960 coding observations. Within each 
observation, each category for cooperation or collusion is coded either 0 or 1. Therefore, the same 
observation may belong to more than one category in each period. We also established two 
summary categories label overall cooperation (Panel A of Table 8) and overall collusion (Panel B 
of Table 8), which are coded as 1 if any of the specific four categories about cooperation (collusion) 
appears, and 0 otherwise.  
                                                 
11 Collusion is a form of cooperation. However, in this study, “cooperation” refers to working hard and/or effort 
increasing cooperation. “Collusion” in this study only refers to minimizing effort because collusion within a team 
would lead to zero effort due to the fixed reward and costly effort. 
12 Taking each single team and period as one unit for coding is consistent with Sutter and Strassmair (2009). 
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Table 9 presents pairwise comparisons between conditions using logistic regressions. 
There are several general patterns that we see. First, we find that between-team incentives 
(BETWEEN and BOTH conditions) increase cooperation within teams (“overall cooperation” 
category, all p-values < 0.01). Specifically, compared to NONE and WITHIN conditions, in 
BETWEEN and BOTH conditions, individuals are significantly more likely to cooperate with their 
team members by proposing to choose high effort levels within their team or stating their own 
choices of high effort (category C2), by agreeing on their team members’ high effort proposals 
(category C3) and by giving reasons why they need to choose high efforts (category C4). Second, 
we find that between-team incentives (BETWEEN and BOTH conditions) decrease collusion 
within teams (“overall collusion” category, all p-values < 0.01). Specifically, individuals are 
significantly less likely to propose low effort within a team (category C5), to agree on team 
members’ suggestions of contributing low effort (category C6), and to give reasons why they need 
to choose low effort (category C8). Further, we find that BOTH condition is the most effective in 
mitigating the collusion problem (“overall collusion” category, all p-values < 0.05). These findings 
can be summarized as following: 
Result 5: Between-team incentives increase cooperation and decrease collusion within 
teams, and the collusion problem is mostly mitigated when between-team incentives are combined 
with within-team incentives. 
 
5. Discussions and Conclusion 
We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and within-
team incentives affects behavior in team tournaments. The theoretical Nash equilibrium predicts 
that free-riding behavior is likely to occur when there are only between-team incentives, but 
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offering within-team incentives may solve this problem. However, if individuals collude within a 
team, then within-team incentives may not be as effective at reducing free-riding.  
The results of our experiment indicate that although between-team incentives are effective 
at increasing individual effort, as predicted by the theory, there is substantial free-riding and 
declining effort over time. Within-team incentives are also effective at increasing individual effort, 
albeit not as effective as between-team incentives in our experiment and not without collusion. 
Most importantly, a combination of between-team and within-team incentives is very effective not 
only at generating effort but also at sustaining effort over time, mitigating the free-riding problem, 
increasing cooperation and decreasing collusion within teams. 
What are the implications of our findings? First, our study provides evidence that 
individuals exert the greatest effort when organizations use a combination of between-team and 
within-team incentives. Using both incentives simultaneously is important for mitigating the free-
riding problem within teams and sustaining effort over time. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
tournament-like incentives have been gaining more popularity in the workplace (Che and Yoo, 
2001; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Connelly et al., 2014). 
Second, our findings show that when individuals are allowed to communicate they appear 
to not only maximize their individual payoff, but also their joint team payoff. This finding 
contributes to the literature studying how communication enhances social identity within teams 
(Sutter and Strassmair, 2009; Cason et al., 2012, 2017). Specifically, social identity theory suggests 
that one of the most distinctive features of group identity and intergroup relations is positive 
distinctiveness – a belief that “we” are better than “them” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, 1984; 
Hogg, 2006). Communication may help individuals to enhance their group identity causing team 
members to go to great lengths to protect and promote positive distinctiveness from other teams 
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and thus contribute more effort to help their teams win reward (Hogg, 2006). Allowing 
communication also generalizes to the workplace as between-team tournaments are unlikely in 
environments were communication or direct contact between participants is not possible. 
Although we only used tournaments in our experiment, we believe that our results are also 
applicable to other relative performance incentive settings (Cason et al., 2010; Agranov and 
Tergiman, 2013; Güth et al., 2016). The tournament winner is determined by calculating the 
team/individual’s performance (output) relative to other teams/individuals. Although individuals’ 
absolute effort levels may change when using other relative performance incentives, the direction 
of the effort differences across the incentive settings should hold. Future research could explore 
how effective between-team and within-team incentives are in other relative performance incentive 
settings, how individuals change their behavior in response to asymmetric valuations of a reward 
or individuals’ heterogeneity in costs/abilities, and how results change when communication is 
costly. 
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Figure 1: Experimental procedures. 
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Figure 2: Average effort. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Average effort across 10 periods. 
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Table 1: Summary of experimental conditions. 
 
  Within-team incentive 
  No Yes 
Between-team  No NONE WITHIN 
incentive Yes BETWEEN BOTH 
 
 
Table 2: Theoretical predictions. 
 
 Effort prediction 
Condition Individual  Joint  Mixed = (Individual + Joint) / 2  
NONE 
 
0 = 0 0 = 0 0 = 0 
WITHIN (𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼2𝑁𝑁2  = 20 0 = 0 (𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼4𝑁𝑁2  = 10 
BETWEEN 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼4𝑁𝑁2  = 10 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼4𝑁𝑁  = 30 (𝑁𝑁 + 1)2 (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼)4𝑁𝑁2  = 20 
BOTH 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + (2𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼4𝑁𝑁2  = 30 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼4𝑁𝑁  = 30 (𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼4𝑁𝑁2 + (𝑁𝑁 + 1)2 (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼)4𝑁𝑁2  = 30 
 
 
Table 3: Average effort and payoff. 
 
 
Condition 
 
Participants 
Independent 
observations 
Average  
effort 
Standard  
deviation 
Average  
payoff 
Standard  
deviation 
NONE 36 12 9.47 7.75 110.53 7.75 
WITHIN 36 12 25.07 7.84 94.93 8.10 
BETWEEN 36 12 42.61 11.31 77.38 11.31 
BOTH 36 12 47.15 4.16 72.35 3.87 
 
 
Table 4: Average effort difference between conditions. 
 
 
Conditions 
Independent  
observations 
Average  
difference 
Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
 
p-value 
BOTH + BETWEEN vs. WITHIN + NONE 48 27.61 5.62 < 0.01 
BOTH + WITHIN vs. BETWEEN + NONE 48 10.07 1.77 = 0.07 
BOTH vs. NONE 24 37.68 4.15 < 0.01 
BOTH vs. WITHIN 24 22.07 4.15 < 0.01 
BOTH vs. BETWEEN 24 4.53 0.46 = 0.64 
BETWEEN vs. WITHIN 24 17.54 3.34 < 0.01 
BETWEEN vs. NONE 24 33.14 4.09 < 0.01 
WITHIN vs. NONE 24 15.61 3.69 < 0.01 
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Table 5: Average effort difference between conditions (within-subject comparison). 
 
 
Conditions 
Independent 
observations 
Average 
difference 
Wilcoxon  
signed-rank 
 
p-value 
BOTH vs. NONE 8 33.60 2.52 = 0.01 
BOTH vs. WITHIN 8 25.85 2.52 = 0.01 
BOTH vs. BETWEEN 8 13.53 2.24 = 0.02 
BETWEEN vs. WITHIN 8 19.74 2.52 = 0.01 
BETWEEN vs. NONE 8 36.23 2.52 = 0.01 
WITHIN vs. NONE 8 20.94 2.52 = 0.01 
 
 
Table 6: Time series cross-sectional regression analysis. 
 
Independent  
variables 
Condition 
NONE WITHIN BETWEEN BOTH All conditions 
Period -1.06*** 
(0.47) 
0.25 
(0.37) 
-1.20*** 
(0.41) 
-0.32 
(0.42) 
-0.58*** 
(0.22) 
Constant 15.30*** 
(3.82) 
23.67*** 
(2.45) 
49.24*** 
(2.74) 
48.91*** 
(2.37) 
12.67*** 
(2.61) 
WITHIN 
    
15.60*** 
(3.08) 
BETWEEN 
    
33.14*** 
(3.83) 
BOTH 
    
37.68*** 
(2.45) 
Note: * p-value < 0.10, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 7: Frequency of free-riding (effort of 0). 
 
 Condition 
Period NONE WITHIN BETWEEN BOTH 
1 26 10 6 1 
2 26 10 4 1 
3 35 13 10 5 
4 39 23 10 4 
5 46 16 13 2 
6 51 19 9 2 
7 51 15 14 2 
8 52 17 16 3 
9 49 16 8 5 
10 48 13 13 6 
Total 189 152 103 31 
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Table 8: Summary of communication messages. 
 
Category Description NONE WITHIN BETWEEN BOTH 
Panel A: Cooperation within teams 
C1 Ask for the opinions of other team members 
 
0.188 0.333 0.379 0.396 
C2 Proposal to choose high efforts within team 
or state own choice of high efforts 
0.129 0.167 0.654 0.692 
C3 Agree on team members’ proposals of high 
effort 
0.058 0.075 0.554 0.571 
C4 Give reasons why need to choose high 
efforts 
0.025 0.008 0.104 0.146 
 Overall cooperation 
 
0.263 0.413 0.725 0.750 
Panel B: Collusion within teams 
C5 Proposal to choose low efforts within team 
or state own choice of low efforts 
0.529 0.558 0.221 0.129 
C6 Agree on team members’ proposals of low 
effort 
0.371 0.392 0.146 0.063 
C7 Proposal to take turns in winning the 
tournament 
0.000 0.142 0.000 0.021 
C8 Give reasons why need to choose low efforts 
 
0.233 0.167 0.050 0.038 
 Overall collusion 
 
0.567 0.600 0.221 0.146 
 
 
Table 9: Summary of communication messages. 
 
Category BOTH 
vs. 
NONE 
BOTH 
vs. 
WITHIN 
BOTH 
vs. 
BETWEEN 
BETWEEN 
vs. 
WITHIN 
BETWEEN 
vs. 
NONE 
WITHIN 
vs. 
NONE 
Panel A: Cooperation within teams 
C1 *** 0.131 0.690 *** 0.266 ** 
C2 *** *** 0.371 *** *** 0.242 
C3 *** *** 0.637 *** *** 0.463 
C4 *** *** 0.157 ** ** 0.173 
Overall *** *** 0.519 *** *** ** 
Panel B: Collusion within teams 
C5 *** *** * *** *** 0.517 
C6 *** *** * *** *** 0.636 
C7 NA *** N/A N/A N/A N/A 
C8 *** *** 0.504 *** *** 0.067 
Overall *** *** * *** *** 0.456 
Note: The p-values reported in this table are based on Wald Chi-Square statistics. 
* p-value < 0.05, ** p-value < 0.001, *** p-value < 0.0001 
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Appendix A – Theoretical Derivations 
We can rewrite the expected payoff (4) as: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴+𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 12� �1𝑁𝑁 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + �𝛽𝛽 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽) 1𝑁𝑁�𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼� − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.   (A1) 
Further expanding the expression, we get: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴+𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 12� �1𝑁𝑁 (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼) + 𝛽𝛽 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼� − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴
𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴+𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
1
𝑁𝑁
(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼) + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴+𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 +                       +(1 − 𝛼𝛼) 1
2
1
𝑁𝑁
(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼) + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 12 𝛽𝛽 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  .  (A2) 
Differentiating (A2) with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, we receive the following FOC: 
𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴+𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵)2 𝛼𝛼 1𝑁𝑁 (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼) + 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴+𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵−𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴+𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵)2 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 12 𝛽𝛽 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴−𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴)2 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 = 1.  (A3) 
Solving for the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we receive: 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇+𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼)+𝛽𝛽(2𝑁𝑁−2)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼4𝑁𝑁2 .        (A4) 
If the expected payoff is given by (6), then the maximization problem is the following: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴+𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 12� (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼) − 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖.     (A5) 
Further expanding the expression, we get: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴+𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼) + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 12 (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼) − 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 .    (A6) 
Differentiating (A6) with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, we receive the following FOC: 
𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴+𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵)2 𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼) = 1.         (A7) 
Solving for the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we receive: 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇+𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼)4𝑁𝑁 .         (A8) 
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Appendix B (Not for Publication) – Experimental Instructions 
 
General Instructions 
 
Welcome! You are participating in a decision-making study. The study will proceed in two parts. 
Each part requires you to make a series of choices which will determine your total compensation 
for the study.  
 
Your decisions as well as the decisions of other participants will remain anonymous. The 
decision problems are not designed to test you; there is no right or wrong answer. I am simply 
interested in the choices you make. You will be paid privately in cash at the end of the study. 
The points you earn in the study will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of 20 to 1. The 
amount you earn will depend on your decisions, so please follow the instructions carefully.  
 
Please turn off your cell phone, laptop computer, or any other device you may have brought with 
you. To maintain anonymity, please do not communicate, unless directed otherwise, with any 
other participants until the study is completely over. If at any point you have a question, or need 
assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk. Thank you for your 
cooperation. 
 
Instructions for Part 1 
 
Part 1 of the study consists of several decision-making periods. At the beginning of the first 
period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a team of 3 people. You will remain 
in the same team for all periods in Part 1 of the study.  
 
At the beginning of the first period, your team will be randomly paired with another team to 
share bonuses. Your team will be paired with the same team for all periods in Part 1 of the 
study. 
 
TEAM NAME 
 
After you are assigned to a team, you will be asked to communicate with your team members via 
a chat window to decide on a team name. However, to maintain anonymity, it is very important 
that you do not reveal your name, seat number or anything that might disclose your identity to 
your teammates.  
 
YOUR DECISION 
 
Assume you are an employee of ABC Company. Your compensation package consists of the 
following:  
(1) a base salary (your participation fee today),  
(2) any endowed points you keep (unallocated points), and  
(3) two bonuses to be awarded at the end of each period: Group Bonus and Individual Bonus.  
 
In each period your company will award two bonuses: 
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Group Bonus = 180 points; 
Individual Bonus = 180 points.  
 
In each period you will be given an endowment of 60 points and asked to decide how much to 
contribute. You may contribute any whole number of points between 0 and 60, inclusively. Any 
leftover or unallocated points are yours to keep (60 – Points Contributed).  
 
For each one point you contribute, you will generate one unit of individual output. A team’s total 
output is the sum of all members’ individual outputs within the team.  
 
A hypothetical example is: 
  Individual Output  
= Points Contributed 
Team Output 
(Sum of Individual Outputs) 
Team 1 Member 1 60  
Team 1 Output 
= 60+ 30 + 10 = 100 
Member 2 30 
Member 3 10 
    
Team 2 Member 1 50  
Team 2 Output 
= 50 + 35 + 20 = 105 
Member 2 35 
Member 3 20 
 
The Individual Bonus and Group Bonus will be awarded as described below. 
 
COMMUNICATION 
 
Each period, before you decide how many points to contribute, you will have the opportunity to 
chat electronically with the members of your OWN team via an anonymous chat window. You 
will have 90 seconds to chat with each other at the beginning of Period 1 and 2, and 40 seconds 
in the following periods. 
 
Again, to remain anonymity, it is very important that you do not make threats or reveal your 
name, seat number or anything that might disclose your identity. While the content of your 
discussion has no direct binding impact on the output or bonuses, you can use the chat window to 
discuss strategy with your teammates. 
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(NONE Condition) YOUR EARNINGS  
 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated as 
follows:  
 
(1) Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from the endowed points you keep 
AND any bonuses you receive from the company. 
 
(2) You may keep or contribute all or some of your 60 points endowment.  
The points you contribute will generate individual and team outputs. 
 
(3) No matter what each team’s total output is, each TEAM will receive 90 points for Group 
Bonus AND 90 points for Individual Bonus.  
 
For example, if the outputs of both teams are as in the table below, both TEAMS will 
receive the same amount for Group and Individual Bonus. 
 
 Team Output Individual & Group bonuses Received 
 
Team 1 160 50% = 90 points 
Team 2 40 50% = 90 points 
Total 200 100% 
 
(4) Every TEAM MEMBER within each team will equally share the Group AND 
Individual bonuses.  
 
PAYMENT 
 
At the end of the study ONE period will be randomly chosen from Part 1 of the study for cash 
payment. Each period has an equal chance of being chosen. Hence each period is independent 
and you should make your decisions carefully in every period. The earnings for the period 
chosen will be converted to a U.S. dollar payment at the end of the study. 
 
Are there any questions? 
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(BETWEEN Condition) YOUR EARNINGS  
 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated as 
follows:  
(1) Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from the endowed points you keep 
AND any bonuses you receive from the company. 
 
(2) You may keep or contribute all or some of your 60 points endowment.  
The points you contribute will generate individual and team outputs which may help your 
team earn Group and/or Individual bonuses as described below. 
 
(3) Only one TEAM will receive the Group AND Individual Bonuses. The Group and 
Individual Bonuses will be awarded to your TEAM based on your team’s output relative 
to the two teams’ total output. For example, if your TEAM contributes 70% of the two 
teams’ total output, your TEAM’s likelihood of winning the Group AND Individual 
Bonuses is 70%.  
 
That is, the greater your TEAM output, the more likely your TEAM will receive both 
bonuses.  
 
For example, if the outputs of both teams are as in the table below, Team 1 has a 80% 
(=160/200) chance of winning the Group and Individual Bonus. 
 
  
Team Output 
Chance (Probability) of Winning 
Individual & Group Bonuses 
Team 1 160 160/200 = 80% 
Team 2 40 40/200 = 20% 
Total 200 100% 
 
(4) If awarded, every team member within the winning team will equally share the Group 
AND Individual Bonuses.  
 
PAYMENT 
 
At the end of the study ONE period will be randomly chosen from Part 1 of the study for cash 
payment. Each period has an equal chance of being chosen. Hence each period is independent 
and you should make your decisions carefully in every period. The earnings for the period 
chosen will be converted to a U.S. dollar payment at the end of the study. 
 
Are there any questions? 
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Instructions for Part 2 
 
The Part 2 of the study also consists of several decision-making periods.  
 
PLEASE NOTE:  
 
All teams formed in Part 1 of the study are NOW DISBANDED.  
 
You will be randomly and anonymously placed into a NEW team of 3 people. Your new 
teammates will NOT be any of the same people you were previously paired with. You will 
remain in the same (new) team for all periods in Part 2 of the study.  
 
At the beginning of the first period, your team will be randomly paired with another team to 
share bonuses. Your team will be paired with the same team for all periods in Part 2 of the 
study. 
 
NEW TEAM NAME 
 
After you are assigned to a NEW team, you will be asked to communicate with your NEW team 
members via a chat window to decide on a NEW team name. Again, to maintain anonymity, it is 
very important that you do not reveal your name, seat number or anything that might disclose 
your identity to your teammates.  
 
YOUR DECISION (Same as in Part 1) 
 
Suppose you have changed companies and your new employer is XYZ Company. You will make 
the same decision as in Part 1.  
 
In each period your new company will also award two bonuses:  
Group Bonus = 180 points;  Individual Bonus = 180 points.  
 
However, the method for determining who gets what is DIFFERENT.  
 31 
(WITHIN Condition in “NONE&WITHIN combination”) YOUR EARNINGS  
 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated as 
follows:  
 
(1) Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from the endowed points you keep 
AND any bonuses you receive from the company. 
 
(2) You may keep or contribute all or some of your 60 points endowment.  
The points you contribute will generate individual and team outputs which may help your 
team earn Group and/or Individual bonuses as described below. 
 
(3) No matter what each team’s total output is, each TEAM will receive 90 points for Group 
Bonus AND 90 points for Individual Bonus.  
 
For example, if the outputs of both teams are as in the table below, both teams will 
receive the same amount for Group and Individual Bonus. 
 
 Team Output Individual & Group bonuses Received 
Team 1 160 50% = 90 points 
Team 2 40 50% = 90 points 
Total 200 100% 
 
(4) Every TEAM MEMBER within each team will equally share the Group Bonus, i.e. 30 
points per team member. 
 
(5) However, only one member within each team will receive the Individual Bonus. The 
Individual Bonus will be awarded to you based on your individual output relative to the 
total output within your team. For example, if you contribute 70% of your team’s total 
output, your likelihood of winning the Individual Bonus is 70%.  
 
That is, the greater your individual output, the more likely you will receive the 
Individual bonus.  
 
For example, if the outputs of all members within a team are as in the table below, 
Member 2 has a 30% (=30/100) chance of winning the Individual Bonus. 
 
Team 1 or 2 Individual Output Chance (Probability) of Winning Individual Bonus 
Member 1 60 60/100 = 60% 
Member 2 30 30/100 = 30% 
Member 3 10 10/100 = 10% 
Total 100 100% 
 
  
Same as 
Part 1 
Different 
from 
Part 1 
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(BOTH Condition in “WITHIN&BOTH combination”) YOUR EARNINGS  
 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated as 
follows:  
 
(1) Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from the endowed points you keep 
AND any bonuses you receive from the company. 
 
(2) You may keep or contribute all or some of your 60 points endowment.  
The points you contribute will generate individual and team outputs which may help your 
team earn Group and/or Individual bonuses as described below. 
 
(3) Only one TEAM will receive the Group AND Individual Bonuses. The Group and 
Individual Bonuses will be awarded to your TEAM based on your team’s output relative 
to the two teams’ total output. For example, if your TEAM contributes 70% of the two 
teams’ total output, your TEAM’s likelihood of winning both bonuses (Group AND 
Individual Bonuses) is 70%.  
 
That is, the greater the output your TEAM contributes, the more likely your TEAM will 
receive both bonuses. 
 
For example, if the outputs of both teams are as in the table below, Team 1 has a 80% 
(=160/200) chance of winning the Group and Individual Bonus. 
  
Team Output 
Chance (Probability) of Winning 
Individual & Group Bonuses 
Team 1 160 160/200 = 80% 
Team 2 40 40/200 = 20% 
Total 200 100% 
 
(4) If awarded, every team member within the winning team will equally share the Group 
Bonus.  
 
(5) However, if awarded the Individual Bonus, only one member within the winning team 
will receive the Individual Bonus. The Individual Bonus will be awarded to you based on 
your individual output relative to the total output within your team. For example, if you 
contribute 70% of your team’s total output, your likelihood of winning the Individual 
Bonus is 70%.  
 
That is, the greater your individual output, the more likely you will receive the 
Individual bonus. 
 
For example, if the outputs of all members within a team are as in the table below, 
Member 2 has a 30% (=30/100) chance of winning the Individual Bonus. 
Team 1 or 2 Individual Output Chance (Probability) of Winning Individual Bonus 
Member 1 60 60/100 = 60% 
Member 2 30 30/100 = 30% 
Member 3 10 10/100 = 10% 
Total 100 100% 
Same as 
Part 1 
Different 
from 
Part 1 
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PAYMENT 
 
At the end of the study ONE period will also be randomly chosen from Part 2 of the study for 
cash payment. Each period has an equal chance of being chosen. Hence each period is 
independent and you should make your decisions carefully in every period. The earnings for the 
period chosen will be converted to a U.S. dollar payment at the end of the study. 
 
 
Are there any questions? 
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Manipulation Check (Part 1: ABC company; Part 2: XYZ company) 
 
Part 1: Please answer the following questions (choose only ONE option for each question): 
 
1. At the end of each period in the study, the ABC (XYZ) company will award its 
employees: 
 
A. Group Bonus 
B. Individual Bonus 
C. Group and Individual bonuses 
 
2. The ABC (XYZ) company will award the Group and Individual bonuses to a TEAM 
based on: 
 
A. a team’s output relative to the two teams’ total output. That is, the greater of a team’s 
output is, the more likely the team will receive the Group Bonus. 
B. Each team equally shares the Group and Individual bonuses. 
 
3. When a team receives the Group Bonus: 
 
A. The team member with greater output will be more likely to receive the Group Bonus. 
B. Every member within the team equally shares the Group Bonus. 
 
4. When a team receives the Individual Bonus: 
 
A. The team member with greater output will be more likely to receive the Individual 
Bonus. 
B. Every member within the team equally shares the Individual Bonus. 
 
****************************************************************************** 
 
Please do NOT turn to the next page BEFORE you answer the questions above. 
 
The correct answers to the questions on previous page are (the given answers depend on the 
condition the participant is assigned to): 
 
Question NONE WITHIN BETWEEN BOTH 
1 C C C C 
2 B B A A 
3 B B B B 
4 B A B A 
 
Please check your answers and re-evaluate any wrong answers. 
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Appendix C (Not for Publication) – Additional Analysis 
 
 
Table 4C: Average effort difference between conditions (only Part 1 of the experiment). 
 
 
Conditions 
Independent  
observations 
Average  
difference 
Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
 
p-value 
BOTH + BETWEEN vs. WITHIN + NONE 24 28.02 3.98 < 0.01 
BOTH + WITHIN vs. BETWEEN + NONE 24 7.93 1.15 = 0.24 
BOTH vs. NONE 12 35.96 2.88 < 0.01 
BOTH vs. WITHIN 12 27.50 2.88 < 0.01 
BOTH vs. BETWEEN 12 7.42 0.80 = 0.42 
BETWEEN vs. WITHIN 12 20.08 2.56 < 0.01 
BETWEEN vs. NONE 12 28.53 2.72 < 0.01 
WITHIN vs. NONE 12 8.45 3.69 = 0.03 
 
 
Table 6C: Time series cross-sectional regression analysis (only Part 1 of the experiment). 
 
Independent  
variables 
Condition 
NONE WITHIN BETWEEN BOTH All conditions 
Period -0.58* 
(0.33) 
0.39 
(0.55) 
-1.11*** 
(0.74) 
-0.23 
(0.77) 
-0. 38** 
(0.31) 
Constant 17.01*** 
(3.39) 
20.05*** 
(2.91) 
48.45*** 
(2.49) 
51.03*** 
(3.62) 
15.90*** 
(3.18) 
WITHIN 
    
8.45** 
(3.80) 
BETWEEN 
    
28.53*** 
(5.43) 
BOTH 
    
35.96*** 
(3.05) 
Note: * p-value < 0.10, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
 
